Creating meaning in the practice of life

It is a recent development for philosophy to see itself primarily as a scientific discipline. Dass sich die Philosophie in erster Linie als eine wissenschaftliche Disziplin versteht, ist jüngeren Datums.

For the longest time in its history, not just in Europe, it saw itself at least partially or even, as Pierre Hadot¹ thinks, primarily, as an art of living, not so much as teaching. Philosophizing as a form of successful living. Accordingly, Pyrrhonian skepticism would not be an epistemological position, but a way to achieve peace of mind, and Plato’s doctrine of ideas in the Politeia and Phaidon would be a guide to get to the bottom of being, as Eric Voegelin points out in Order and History and Anamnesis.

One thing is certain: Compared to the sophisticated philosophical debates and practices of Classical Greece and the Hellenistic period, philosophy in the modern era has flattened. Utilitarian views, such as those of Jeremy Bentham², according to which a successful life consists in the realization of the greatest possible personal well-being, continue to dominate international, English-speaking, applied philosophy in different variants.³ Some, most notably Peter Singer, expand the view from themselves to humanity as a whole and then claim that optimizing general human well-being on this planet constitutes a successful life.⁴

When we investigate the meaning of life, we should first turn away from the great philosophical theories and look at our own life and world practice.⁵ There we are confronted with a variety of reasons for doing or not doing one thing or another. And very few of these reasons are aimed at optimizing our own well-being. 

We have set out to write a book, and we want it to be a good book. This gives us ample reasons to spend a lot of time clarifying our own thoughts, weighing up word choices, making sure that the train of thought remains comprehensible and the structure of the work clear. Is there any author in the world who writes in order to optimize their own well-being? There may be people, among whom I can certainly count myself at times, who occasionally experience something like happiness when writing texts. But if they had no other reasons for writing a text, such as to develop a particular argument, to convince others of a philosophical or political position, to complain of a grievance, or to write a fascinating novel, then this feeling of happiness would not be able to set in. In fact, it only sets in when the practice as a whole seems to involve meaning. Optimizing one’s own sense of happiness does not create meaning. People who live their lives according to this motto will sooner or later be confronted with the experience of meaninglessness.

But the other extreme of altruistic self-expression also leads to unhappiness in the end: If I place every activity under the criterion of optimizing general happiness or remedying injustices in the world, then my own life, interactions and communication with others become a mere instrument of a noble but impersonal goal. Without attachments, without responsibility for others close to me, without friendship, love and family cohesion, there is a threat of isolation, which makes a successful life difficult in both the egoistic and altruistic variants.

That which creates meaning on a small scale will also create meaning on a large scale. The satisfaction of having achieved a goal worth striving for cannot be replaced by one’s own satisfaction as a goal in life. If some think they can justify the theory of comprehensive human egoism by the fact that people also increase their own satisfaction by doing something good for others, they are mistaken: The reason for the action was to do something good for someone else, and the satisfaction that comes with success is a gratifying byproduct. This relationship cannot be reversed without losing the meaning of the practice. I cannot set out to do something good for someone else in order to increase my own satisfaction. Because this would mean that I have lost the motive that is the prerequisite for me to be happy about the success. An English bishop⁶ pointed this out long ago, but his elegant refutation of dogmatic egoism has not been able to prevent entire scientific disciplines, especially in economics and sociology, from adhering to it to this day.⁷ So creating meaning means having good reasons. I interpret these realistically.⁸ We are trying to figure out what is a good reason and what is not. Reasons are not merely motives. Rather, we are usually motivated to do that for which there are good reasons. Good reasons create meaning. 

It seems to me questionable whether the diversity of good reasons in our lives can be traced back to just a few or even a single one – which we would call a “principle”. This would go against the grandiose modern attempts to establish, in a reductionist way, one criterion of reasonable practice in philosophy at a time. Kant with his Categorical Imperative on the one hand⁹, and British Utilitarianism, such as in its moderate variant of John Stuart Mill¹⁰, on the other hand, have tried this – in my eyes in vain¹¹. 

Philosophical theory cannot replace diversity in life – including the diversity of life forms and cultural imprints – with just a few principles. Philosophy has a much more modest role; it should help to achieve clarity of thought and concepts, and to uncover and resolve inconsistencies in practice. It is not philosophy that creates meaning, but the reasons in our lives, with philosophy helping to make insights into good reasons result in coherent practice.

Looking at global political practice, it is obvious that this is highly incoherent. In many areas of social and environmental challenges, there is no longer a problem of identification. In any case, we know in broad outline what needs to be done to limit climate change to a tolerable level. We know pretty well what needs to be done to permanently end the scandal of persistent hunger and malnutrition in the world. We know what needs to be done to minimize the likelihood of nuclear war. But it seems that the global community is unable to do any of these things. And this is not so much due to the shortcomings of individual governments and politicians, but to the lack of an institutional framework of cosmopolitan responsibility. The addition of individual rational practice does not automatically realize global rationality.

After the long period of the coronavirus crisis, populations in most regions of the world are longing for a return to normality. I do not believe that it will be the historic turning point from which humanity retreats in economic humility and copes with climate change by reducing travel and consumption. It is more likely that the enforced asceticism and distancing will lead to a renewed hunger for life and exuberance, as was the case for a few years in Germany in the 1920s after the currency reform of 1923 and before the world economic crisis of 1929, but also elsewhere in Europe. But the coronavirus crisis has made it clear that we face global challenges that can only be addressed through global common-sense practice. Making a contribution to this creates meaning. Shaping the digital transformation in such a way that it expands rather than diminishes the potential of human authorship, that it promotes sustainable economic activity instead of increasing appetite for energy, provides sufficient grounds for private, cultural, social and political practice. Reasons create meaning. And that applies individually as well as collectively.

Humanist philosophers of all eras have pleaded for using the adaptability of man and the culture in which he lives in such a way that the genuinely humane – one could even say the good in man – is promoted, and the inhumane – the readiness for ruthlessness and violence, the inclination for egoism and dominance – is pushed back. In the present, humanist thought and action have once again found themselves on the defensive.¹² 

Authoritarian regimes are spreading around the world, and populist cynics are gaining the upper hand in long-established democracies. It is all the more important to strengthen the orientation towards the humane, towards the positive potential of human existence; cynical ruthlessness, egoism and violence do not create a sense of life. They leave people feeling empty inside and often broken. The development of one’s own abilities and the abilities of others through individual and communal practice, Aristotle’s bios praktikos¹³, the blossoming of human potential, creates meaning and allows for a fulfilled and rational¹⁴ life.